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This paper investigates human performance on a set of selected tasks in an aviation maintenance organisation,
where a significant prevalence of unsafe acts and conditions were observed. The methodology began with visual
inspections of the work environment. Semi structured interviews were then undertaken to gain an insight into the
job demands and critical issues reported by front line operators. Three representative critical tasks were then
selected for a detailed task analysis. This fed into a task based risk assessment that mapped out safety critical
deviations together with timelines for nominal and deviation paths. The likelihood and severity of potential
outcomes were estimated in terms of loss of productivity. Task performance was assessed in terms of the
likelihood of failure and compared with a monetised risk exposure for both nominal paths and when short cuts and
deviations occurred.
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1. Introduction
Aviation maintenance is a highly regulated industry
which operates to the highest internationally
recognised safety standards. However, significant
accidents are still occurring and human factors play a
significant role in many of them. (Boeing 2003, and
Hawkins 1993).
Aviation maintenance is intrinsically very vulnerable
to human errors as recognised by the U.S. National
Transportation Safety Board, 1979. However, explicit
and systematic consideration for human factors in this
domain only started to take place around 1990
(Mellema, 2018).
Human error can be defined as the failure to complete
a specific task that could result in scheduled
operations interruption or damage to property and
equipment (Reason, 1990). In aviation maintenance,
examples of human error include the installation of
wrong or loose parts, access panels not secured, and
ground lock pins not removed from landing gear

before leaving the hangar (Latorella and Prabhu,
2000).
Graber and Marx (1993) outlined 122 maintenance
errors that took place over a 2 years period. The
underlying issues included; omission (56%);
installation issues (30%) wrong parts (8%), and other
(6%). These results endorse the relevance of humans
during aviation maintenance (Dhillon and Liu, 2007).
A “Dirty Dozen” human factors are recognised to
be the main causal agents of accidents in the aviation
industry which are here summarised as; a lack of
communication,
knowledge,
teamwork
or
assertiveness, distractions, fatigue, pressure, lack of
awareness, stress, and complacency (Mellema, 2018
and Dupont, 1997).

1.1. Background to the study
This paper presents an investigation into the
operational implications of deviations in human
performance. It used a set of selected tasks,
where repeated deviations were detected in a
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particular maintenance organisation. As the
study developed, a cost benefit analysis was
introduced in order to quantify costs associated
with historical accidents and resulting monetised
risk exposures that organisations encounter when
deviations and procedural short cuts occur. This
approach was influenced by Virovac, Domitrovic
and Bazijanac (2017). These authors also
investigated the prevalence of human error in an
aviation
maintenance
organisation,
fully
compliant with European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) and ICAO Human Factor
Guidelines for Aircraft Maintenance Manual
(Doc 9859-AN/474).
The participating organisation in this study, was
interested in how unsafe acts and shortcuts could
create a false sense of added value. This value
was thought to have originated from the highly
competitive nature of the business which
demands constant high levels of productivity and
performance including short turnaround times
for all maintenance interventions.
A further question was how a human factors
based approach could highlight any hidden costs
and monetised exposure connected with the
observed procedural short cuts and deviations. It
was then possible to design a proactive safety
program, aimed at increasing both productivity
and safety for maintenance operations.
1.2. Current data on accident and incident
performance in the company
The organisation has a recent history.
Operations started in 2009 and the focus on
accident reporting was not fully developed till
late 2013. Therefore it was assumed that accident
records up to 2013 underestimates the safety
reality of the production floor. The overall
reporting culture in the organisation is still an
underlying problem. The following table
represents the number of lost time accidents per
year with the number of aircraft which passed
through the hangar from 2009 to 2018.
Table 1: Representation of the number of lost time accidents
per year and the number of aircraft through the hangars.
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012

No. of
accidents
1
4
8
24

No. of lost
time accidents
No data
No data
No data
No data

No. of aircraft
No data
No data
No data
51

Year
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

No. of
accidents
17
29
36
38
42
69

No. of lost
time accidents
No data
No data
No data
11
16
29

No. of aircraft
59
61
47
51
72
50

Table 1, demonstrates a steady increase in
accidents, but under-reporting must also be
borne in mind. As a result of an internal safety
awareness programme in late 2017 the most
reliable data is from 2018. In 2018 there was a
total of 29 accidents where the injured party was
unfit to work for periods ranging from 1 to 55
days. As section 5 in this paper will show, the
financial implication of these days lost
underlines the result that
“accidents cost
money”.
3. Methodology
Figure 1 details the step by step methodological
approach applied in this study. Data generation
began with visual inspections of the work
environment to observe safety related conditions
and behaviours. A total of 77 such inspection
were conducted. This was followed by 20 semi
structured interviews that were undertaken to
gain an insight into the job demands and critical
issues reported by front line operators. Three
representative critical tasks were then selected.
This allowed for detailed task analysis which
was then fed into a task based risk assessment to
map out safety critical deviations together with
timelines for the nominal and deviation paths.
Following this step, the likelihood of deviations
were estimated along with the severity of
potential outcomes in terms of loss of
productivity (based on past-recorded incidents).
Finally, task performance was fiscally assessed
by; comparing monetised risk exposures for
nominal paths and alterative task flows incurred
when short cuts and deviations were present.

Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability Conference

7
8

389

Left landing gear
Right landing gear

3.1.1 Audit and Inspection results
There were a total of 77 inspections conducted
in all zones. These inspections revealed an
overall mean level of non-compliance with
required procedures of circa 19%. The worst
visual inspection result recorded circa 49% noncompliance.
Examples of non compliance included poor
housekeeping standards (PH), not wearing
personal protection equipment (PPE) the
presence of slip, trip and fall hazards (STF) and
chemical safety issues . Overall levels of non
compliance are presented in Figure 2.
Fig. 1. Methodological approach

3.1 Audit of work environment and visual
inspection step
The audit included visual inspection and the
collection of relevant documentation. Visual
inspection is defined as a traditional manual
activity that involves careful and critical
assessment of an object or area with reference to
a predefined standard (Drury and Watson, 2002).
Drury’s two stage model of inspection
performance is the most revered and commonly
cited within the domain of Visual Inspection.
The model is encompassed by a ‘Search’ and
‘Decide’ methodology. The ‘Search’ aspect of
the model contains the investigation of an item
or area against a pre-conceived set of standards.
Whilst, ‘decide’ encompasses whether or not the
fault exceeds or falls short of said standards.
This study also developed checklists to
benchmark the levels of safety compliance.
Inspections were conducted within pre-defined
zones, which related to areas of high incident
rates gathered from the analysis of historical
accident reports available (see Table 2).
Table 2: Working Zones inspected
Zone
1
2
3
4
5
6

Position on aircraft
Left wing above
Left wing below
Right wing above
Right wing below
Left engine
Right engine

Figure 2 - Number of non-conformity identified during the
audits versus items.

Poor standards of housekeeping were not only
connected to a higher level of safety hazards.
They also potentially related to productivity loss.
For example tools not being in their designated
place meant that operators had to search for the
appropriate equipment, which in some cases was
not available within the time window allocated to
perform the activity. Housekeeping was
measured in terms of high, moderate and low
level of compliance. Figure 2 also demonstrates
that poor housekeeping issues were identified as
the most prevalent safety related issue and
observed in circa 74% of all visual inspections
completed. Examples of poor housekeeping also
included tools, rags, liquid spills, electrical
cables, and air hoses left scattered around the
workplace, These were classified as slip, trip and
fall hazards.
The data obtained presented a number of issues
with regards to Personal Protective Equipment
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(PPE). High levels of non-compliance were
observed among operators in the landing gear
zone (Table 2). Of the 18 inspections conducted
on the landing gear area, there were 4 instances
of operators not wearing any eye protection
while completing work on the landing gear. This
allowed potential eye splashes from “Skydrol”, a
hazardous hydraulic fluid which is able to cause
severe eye or skin irritation requiring medical
attention.
During the semi-structured interviews, a member
of staff reported: “if you get Skydrol in the eye, it
feels like you have been hit on the head with a
bat”. Accidents involving Skydrol therefore led
to operational issues connected to delays, work
interruptions and poor hand over as well as
quality issues in production.
3.2 Interview step
Rubin and Rubin (2005) contend that semi
structured interviews create a flexible way in
which to structure an interview. Furthermore,
this mode of interview allows the interviewer to
probe and expand on areas but extract a greater
understanding and more detailed responses.
Hence semi structured interviews were
employed to gain, a greater understanding of the
domain and the human factors relating to the
specific tasks. They were also used to probe
possible shortcuts and deviations from required
procedures.

noted by one interviewee that the housekeeping
standards had been underlined as an issue by a
regulatory body during a routine audit.
3.3 The Task analysis step
Task analysis consists of investigating the
interaction between human capabilities and a
system in order to reach a goal. It can increase
productivity, identify human error and hazards as
well as collect inputs for human reliability
assessment (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). In
this study task analysis was used to build a
detailed
picture
of
three
pre-selected
maintenance tasks before analysing them from a
human performance perspective.
Procedural tasks descriptions were derived from
standard operating procedure manuals and
applicable aviation authority requirements.
Flowcharts were then used to illustrate the
sequence of mapped steps. Potential deviations
associated with each process step were identified
and actual shortcuts and deviations were
observed during the conduct of the three selected
task. In addition each task was timed in order to
determine the ideal duration of the process. The
timing was performed for the nominal flow (task
with no deviation) and for the possible deviation
paths considered too (the execution of the each
task with deviations). Timings were gathered
during five repetitions of each task and path.
3.3.1 Time task based

Interviews were conducted with 20 maintenance
engineers with varying levels of experience and
approvals. Interviewees were selected on the
basis of assuring a representative sample and
also took into account previous accident reports
and regulatory inspections results.
3.2.1 Interview results
The interview data presented an underlying
feeling of ‘pressure’ amongst the operators, to
complete required works within a set period of
time, which is set by the sales team as part of the
work scope and contractual agreement with the
aircraft owner.
The interview data also raised about the
standards of housekeeping and their association
with possible accidents. Furthermore, it was

!

By timing the process on five occasions it was
possible to identify the mean duration of each
nominal task and of each different deviation path
taken. The time taken for recovery and corrective
actions implemented was also obtained.
3.3.1.1 Removal of the fuel filter
During his interview, the supervisor of this task
reported not closing a particular valve as the
most significant deviation. This could potentially
result in eye injuries from a splashes of jet fuel.
If this occurs, circa one day would be lost from;
treating the injury, finding replacement staff and
delays in finishing the task.
This hazard can be prevented by wearing eye
protection but the non use of PPE was observed
in circa 60% of the time. The mean time to
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correct this deviation by going to fetch and wear
the PPE was 3 minutes and 40 seconds.
Table 3. Timing of the removal of the engine filter
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4.1 Removal of an electric pump
The electric pump itself is located in the wheel
well of the landing gear. In completing this task
there is again a possibility of coming in contact
with hydraulic fluid (Skydrol). Therefore, prior
to any works a depressurisation of the hydraulic
system closely followed by the draining of all
fluid in the line into the appropriate chemical
resistant container is required. The main hazard
during this task is eye contact with hydraulic
fluid in the line (Skydrol). In 2018 there was
eight such accidents. Overall this task is not
carried out frequently but is considered high risk
due to high volumes of hydraulic fluid present.

3.3.1.2 Removal of the electric pump
According to procedures the hydraulic line
must be shut off meaning there is no pressurized
fluid in the line. However residual skydrol can
still exist in the general working area. The
deviations observed in this task were; not using
PPE during the easing of tightened nuts and
bolts. As reported during interviews seized nuts
can occur due to inadequate lubrication,
corrosion or damage.
Table 4. Timing of the removal of the electric pump
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3.3.1.3 Removal of fuel tank panel
Seized nuts and not wearing PPE were also
observed in this task. In this case, three different
pieces of equipment may be necessary to remove
nuts and bolts dependent on how easy they are to
remove.
Table 5. Timing Removal of fuel tank panel
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4.2 Removal of the fuel filter element
The removal of the fuel filter element presents
different hazards. The removal of the filter itself
is a fairly straightforward task, but this can lead
to issues of complacency. The task itself should
only take about 15mins to complete without any
deviations. However a direct result of this
simplicity staff tended not to wear bump caps.
The engine cowling in the vicinity has sharp
edges, which have proven to cause lacerations to
the head over the years. Although not evident on
the accident register, staff frequently reported
hitting their head off engine cowlings during
safety training sessions.
4.3 Removal of access panels
The removal of access panels can either be
extremely straightforward or highly tedious. The
process entails removing nuts, bolts, clamp rings
and gaskets before the panel can be removed.
Based on the timings taken, the main deviations
observed were removing damaged or seized
bolts. When this occurred, task execution times
were delayed by up to 1 hour and 56 mins. The
main hazard associated with this task is the
presence of residual jet fuel. As the panels are
being removed, this residual fuel can spill out
resulting in either skin or eye contact. In two out
of the five observations on removing access
panels, staff were found not wearing protective
eyewear. In 2018 there was a total of twelve eye
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related accidents. Three of these resulted in loss
time ranging between 2 and 12 days.

of €1.17. This value represents 0.07% of the
total cost of the injury.

5. Task based risk assessment results and
monetised risk exposure
The two shortcuts most observed during the
three selected tasks, were the non-usage of
required equipment and PPE. In order to
monetise the risk exposure for accidents due to
these deviations, company accident data were
analysed for 2018.

Table 6: Estimated risk exposure and timing for deviation

The costs of accident from the accident data
included; the salary paid to the injured party
during absent days, the salary paid to the
substitute operators, and all medical treatment
related fees. The likelihood of each accident
scenario was then calculated by dividing the
number of relevant injuries by the number of
aircraft passing through the organisations hangar
during 2018. This allowed an evidence based
approximation of likelihood of the accident and
resultant monetised values.
5.1 Task based risk assessment results and
monetised risk exposure results
5.1.1 Removal of Fuel Filter
Inadequate use of bump caps were observed as
shortcuts when observing and timing the removal
of fuel filters. During a visual inspection an
actual accident was witnessed, whereby an
operator struck their head on the engine cowl.
Cowls are commonplace on aircraft and often
possess sharp edges, therefore bump caps should
be worn by operators when working in their
vicinity.
In 2018, there were 6 injuries from not wearing
bump caps with a throughput of 50 aircraft.
Dividing these two variables leads to an
estimated likelihood of 12%. Furthermore, the
mean cost of the injuries from not wearing bump
caps was estimated to be circa €1,711.
It was further found that injuries from not
wearing bump caps resulted in circa one hour of
delay due to locating a qualified substitute
operator to complete the task. In comparison The
time taken to get the bump cap is less than 8
minutes from task timings, which denotes a cost

Path

Time
estimate

Nominal
path
Deviations:
skin burn
due
to
corrosive
lubricant

0.31 hrs
0.22 hrs

Monetised
risk
exposure of
deviation
NA

Delay
estimate

0.12
*€1,711

2 hrs

7 mins

5.1.2 Removal of Electrical Pump
For the removal of the access panel, the lack of
eye protection was identified as a shortcut
resulting in the potential for eye injuries from
contact with hydraulic fluid. In 2018, there were
15 such accidents. The estimated likelihood of
such accidents comes to 30% and meant costs
were circa €1,197.78.
There were also productivity losses from due to
some 1.5 hours of delays again from locating
suitably qualified substitute operators to
complete the task. The maximum time estimated
to procure and wear eye protection was found to
be 4 minutes, costing the company €1.38. This
value is some 0.12% of the total cost of such
accidents.
Table 7: Estimated risk exposure and timing for deviation

Path

Time
estimate

Nominal
path
Deviations
: hydraulic
fluid
droplets
resulting
in
eye
injury

2.44 hrs
2.40 hrs

Monetised
risk
exposure of
deviation
NA

Delay
estimate

0.3
*€1,197.8

1.5 hrs

4 mins

5.1.3 Removal of Access Panel
The shortcut observed here was not wearing the
gloves while performing the panel removal
activity. Panel removal is likely to expose the
workers to droplets of corrosive chemicals used
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as lubricants. Contact with such corrosive
chemicals can cause skin irritation and burns.
In 2018 five such accidents were recorded
involving skin burns. The estimated likelihood
was calculated at around 10%. The estimated
cost associated to this type of injury was circa
€842.19.
For this type of accident delays cam to about 2
hours again for the locating and briefing
qualified substitute operators to complete the
task. The time taken to get the required gloves is
less than 8 min. This represents a cost of €0.82
for the company or 0.09% of the cost associated
to the overall injury.

Table 8: Estimated risk exposure and timing for deviation

Path

Time
estimate

Nominal
path
Deviations:
skin burn
due
to
corrosive
lubricant

1.10 hrs
1.02 hrs

Monetised
risk
exposure of
deviation
NA

Delay
estimate

0.1
€842.19

2 hrs

4 mins

393

This study found that mean times taken for
operator to procure the right required equipment
and PPE took circa 7 extra minutes of their time.

6. Conclusions
Shortcuts and deviations are examples human
factor, issues affecting the safety and quality of
aviation maintenance tasks. This study
investigated the costs and delays to a sub set of
tasks where short cuts and deviations were
observed.
Personnel perceived themselves to be under
pressure and therefore willing to use ‘acceptable
shortcuts’ to achieve targets. However, the short
cuts did not save money or increase productivity.
Based on the cost benefit analysis completed,
there was little evidence of productivity gains by
using shortcuts. Furthermore a high number of
accidents occurred due to these shortcuts which
if prevented, would have saved the organisation
time and money.
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